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TAKING DISTINCTION TO THE NEXT LEVEL:  
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR FIGHTERS’ FAILURE 
TO DISTINGUISH THEMSELVES FROM 
CIVILIANS 
Laurie R. Blank* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Suicide bombings, terrorist attacks, rockets launched from civilian 
residences, weapons stored in mosques or hospitals—these now 
common news stories from conflicts share one common thread:  the 
erosion of the distinction between fighter and civilian during armed 
conflict.  The principle of distinction is one of the fundamental principles 
of the law of armed conflict (“LOAC”) and obligates all parties to a 
conflict to distinguish between combatants and civilians—between those 
who are fighting and those who are not.  The Geneva Conventions 
establish a framework based on this distinction:  Combatants are entitled 
to participate in hostilities, and are also legitimate targets of attack at all 
times; civilians are immune from attack unless and for so long as they 
participate directly in hostilities.  This distinction lies at the heart of the 
law governing warfare. 
The nature of recent conflicts and the “civilianization” of the 
battlefield have thus led many to question the effectiveness of distinction 
going forward, in essence challenging the very foundations of LOAC.  
Indeed, the use of tactics that ignore this distinction have led some to call 
for new rules to govern warfare or for revisions to the existing law of 
war to address the challenges of contemporary conflict with terrorist 
groups and other non-state actors.  But is distinction truly on the 
defensive, or do we simply need to rethink how we approach this most 
fundamental protective principle? 
Indeed, without a deep and unwavering commitment to distinction 
and its central place in the law of war, the horrors and atrocities of 
armed conflict in the past century may well become merely a prelude. 
LOAC, otherwise known as international humanitarian law or the law of 
war, applies to situations of armed conflict and governs the conduct of 
hostilities and the protection of persons during conflict.1  Distinction is 
                                                 
* Director, International Humanitarian Law Clinic, Emory University School of Law. 
1 See War and International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (Sept. 23, 2011), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/overview-war-and-law.htm.  The law of armed 
conflict is set forth primarily in the four Geneva Conventions of August 14, 1949 and their 
Additional Protocols:  Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 
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one of the “intransgressible principles” of LOAC and the building block 
upon which so many other key provisions and principles of the law are 
founded.2  The first critical step is to recognize that the principle of 
distinction mandates that we distinguish between and among civilians—
between those who are legitimate targets of attack and those who are 
innocent civilians deserving of every protection during the conduct of 
hostilities. 
However, trumpeting the obligation to distinguish between 
combatants and civilians and then bemoaning the blurred and complex 
nature of the zone of combat, in which fighters purposely blend into the 
civilian population and fight from within the civilian infrastructure, 
simply falls short of the mark.  The principle of distinction has two parts.  
It is not sufficient simply to distinguish between innocent civilians and 
legitimate targets in the targeting process.  Persons who are fighting 
must also distinguish themselves from those who are not fighting so as 
to ensure and maximize the protection of innocent civilians.  The nature 
of contemporary conflicts demands that we take distinction to the next 
level and hold non-state actors and others accountable for the failure to 
distinguish themselves from innocent civilians.  The essential next step, 
therefore, is to reinforce this distinction—not only in the conduct of 
hostilities but also in the post-conflict accountability phase.  International 
criminal tribunals have issued numerous convictions and sentences for 
deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and 
disproportionate attacks on civilians—all violations of the principle of 
distinction.  However, accountability for violations in this second part of 
distinction, which this Article will refer to as distinction in conduct, lags 
far behind. 
This Article explores how the failure to hold persons accountable for 
perfidy and other violations of the obligation to distinguish will continue 
to undermine the ability of the law to provide maximum protection to 
innocent civilians during armed conflict.  These violations pose an equal 
                                                                                                             
adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I]; Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted by Conference June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter AP II]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter GC II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GC III]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. 
2 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 79 
(July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 
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danger to civilians when soldiers cannot tell who is an innocent civilian 
and who is a fighter simply disguised in civilian clothes.  When militants 
benefit both tactically and strategically from the use of the civilian 
population as a shield and as a disguise, the international community 
must take distinction to the next level and demand accountability for 
such violations as a critical step in the protection of civilians during 
armed conflict. 
The first section of this Article sets forth the parameters of the 
principle of distinction and how LOAC implements this fundamental 
principle.  In addition, the first section explores the challenges and 
complexities of contemporary warfare, specifically with relation to the 
obligations of distinction.  The second section addresses current trends 
and efforts in the implementation and enforcement of the principle of 
distinction.  Militaries operationalize distinction through rules of 
engagement that focus on the concepts of hostile act and hostile intent, 
rather than the formal legal distinction between civilian and combatant.  
The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals—as well as 
other courts and tribunals—includes extensive precedent regarding the 
obligations of distinction in targeting.  However, this wealth of 
jurisprudence does not extend to violations of the obligations all parties 
have to distinguish themselves from innocent civilians, creating a range 
of risks for civilians and soldiers alike.  Finally, this Article highlights 
LOAC’s untapped potential, a gap resulting from the failure to enforce 
distinction on both sides of the coin. 
II.  DISTINCTION:  PAST AND PRESENT 
One of the most fundamental issues during conflict is identifying 
who or what can be targeted.  The principle of distinction, one of the 
“cardinal principles of [international humanitarian law],” requires that 
any party to a conflict distinguish between those who are fighting and 
those who are not, and direct attacks solely at the former.3  Similarly, 
parties must distinguish between civilian objects and military objects 
and target only the latter. 
Distinction has a long pedigree and has been a central tenet of 
warfare for thousands of years.  Many ancient codes of conduct during 
wartime differentiated in some way between those who could be killed 
and those who must be spared.4  For example, in his orders to his 
                                                 
3 Id. ¶ 78 (Higgins, J., dissenting) (declaring that distinction and the prohibition on 
unnecessary suffering are the two cardinal principles of international humanitarian law). 
4 See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 42 (1977) (“[T]he general conception of 
war as a combat between combatants . . . turns up again and again in anthropological and 
historical accounts.”).  For example, the Mahabharata text tracing the history of the 
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commanders, the first caliph, Abu Bakr, stated, “‘[t]he blood of women, 
children and old people shall not stain your victory.’”5  The Greeks 
considered the temples, embassies, priests, and envoys of the opposite 
side inviolable.6  Beginning with Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, 
early legal theorists began to set forth a framework for who could be 
killed during armed conflict—the underpinnings of today’s principle of 
distinction.  Thus, St. Thomas Aquinas declared that “it is no way lawful 
to slay the innocent.”7  During the Enlightenment, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau advanced this thinking significantly, focusing primarily on 
distinguishing between those who bore arms and those who did not.  In 
this way, Rousseau formulated the principle of noncombatant immunity 
in terms that remain vital and recognizable today: 
Since the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy State, it 
is legitimate to kill the latter’s defenders so long as they 
are carrying arms; but as soon as they lay them down and 
surrender, they cease to be enemies or agents of the 
enemy, and again become mere men, and it is no longer 
legitimate to take their lives.8 
Although early wars were often uncompromising in their brutality, these 
early moral, religious, and legal precepts and teachings established a 
firm foundation for the modern law of war and the notion of 
discrimination between and among persons on the battlefield. 
                                                                                                             
Kurukshetra War stated, “[h]e is no son of the Vishni race who slayeth a woman, a boy or 
an old man.”   L.C. Green, Enforcement of the Law in International and Non-International 
Conflicts—The Way Ahead, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 285, 287 (1996).  Similarly, the 
prophet Elisha warned the king against the killing of civilians:  “[W]hen thou comest nigh 
unto a city to fight against it, . . . thou shalt smite every male therof with the edge of the 
sword:  But the women, and the little ones, and the cattle, and all that is in the city . . . shalt 
thou take unto thyself . . . .”  L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 21 
(1993) [hereinafter THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT].  Also, the Code of 
Hammurabi ordered “protection of the weak against oppression by the strong and ordered 
that hostages be released on payment of a ransom.”  Christopher Greenwood, Historical 
Development and Legal Basis, in THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED 
CONFLICTS 12 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). 
5 Greenwood, supra note 4, at 14. 
6 Id. at 13; see THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 4, at 19 
(discussing how Elisha warned the king against the killing of civilians). 
7 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question XL, Sixth Article (Benziger 
Bros. ed., Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., 1947). 
8 Daphne Richemond-Barak, Nonstate Actors in Armed Conflicts:  Issues of Distinction and 
Reciprocity, in NEW BATTLEFIELDS, OLD LAWS:  FROM THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS TO 
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE 10 (William C. Banks ed., 2011) (quoting JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 
DU CONTRAT SOCIAL [THE SOCIAL CONTRACT] 111 (1762)). 
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A. Distinction in LOAC:  The Basics 
In the modern law of war, distinction was first set forth in Article 22 
of the Lieber Code, the first codification of the law of war, which was 
drafted during the U.S. Civil War: 
Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the 
last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced, 
especially in war on land, the distinction between the 
private individual belonging to a hostile country and the 
hostile country itself, with its men in arms.  The 
principle has been more and more acknowledged that 
the unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, 
and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.9 
A few short years later, the international community reinforced the 
rule in the St. Petersburg Declaration, which stated “[t]hat the only 
legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during 
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy.”10  Although the 
overall purpose of the St. Petersburg Declaration was the prohibition of 
weapons causing unnecessary suffering for combatants, this provision 
confirms the immunity of the civilian population from attack. 
Neither the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 nor the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 contain specific statements of the principle of 
distinction, but its force as customary law remained in effect.  By 1977, 
when the Additional Protocols were drafted, the nature of warfare 
demonstrated the need for a clear restatement of the principle of 
distinction and reinforcement of its central role in LOAC.  Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I thus sets forth the basic rule:  “In order to ensure 
respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, 
the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the 
civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and 
military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only 
against military objectives.”11 
                                                 
9 FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN THE FIELD art. 22, at 9 (1898), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ 
Law/pdf/Instructions-gov-armies.pdf [hereinafter LIEBER CODE]. 
10 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 
Grammes Weight pmbl., Nov. 29, 1868, reprinted in Official Documents, 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUPP. 87, 95 (1907) [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration]. 
11 AP I, supra note 1, art. 48.  Article 48 is considered customary international law.  See 1 
JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS AND LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW Rule 1, at 3–4 (2005) [hereinafter CIHL], available at 
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Distinction lies at the core of LOAC’s seminal goal of protecting 
innocent civilians and persons who are hors de combat.  The obligation to 
distinguish forms part of the customary international law of both 
international and non-international armed conflicts—as the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) held in Tadic.12  As 
a result, all parties to any conflict are obligated to distinguish between 
combatants, or fighters, and civilians, and concomitantly, to distinguish 
themselves from civilians, and their own military objects from civilian 
objects.13  The purpose of distinction, to protect civilians, is emphasized 
in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, which states that “[t]he civilian 
population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object 
of attack.”14  Article 51 continues, stating: 
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited.  Indiscriminate 
attacks are: 
(a) [t]hose which are not directed at a specific military 
objective; 
(b) [t]hose which employ a method or means of combat 
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; 
or 
                                                                                                             
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-
i-icrc-eng.pdf. 
12 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 111, 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 
1995) (citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2675).  The decision states that: 
Bearing in mind the need for measures to ensure the better protection 
of human rights in armed conflicts of all types, [ . . . the General 
Assembly] Affirms the following basic principles for the protection of 
civilian populations in armed conflicts, without prejudice to their 
future elaboration within the framework of progressive development 
of the international law of armed conflict: 
. . . .  
2. In the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts, a 
distinction must be made at all times between persons actively taking 
part in the hostilities and civilian populations. 
Id. (alteration in original); see Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, doc. 6 rev. ¶ 178 (1997); Nuclear Weapons, supra 
note 2, ¶ 79 (distinction is one of the “intransgressible principles of international customary 
law”); CIHL, supra note 11, Rule 1 (explaining that the principle of distinction is customary 
international law in all types of armed conflicts). 
13 U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET NO. 110-31, INTERNATIONAL LAW—THE 
CONDUCT OF ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS 5–8 (1976) [hereinafter AIR FORCE 
PAMPHLET] (‘‘The requirement to distinguish between combatants and civilians, and 
between military objectives and civilian objects, imposes obligations on all the parties to the 
conflict to establish and maintain the distinctions.”). 
14 AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(2). 
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(c) [t]hose which employ a method or means of combat 
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol; 
and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to 
strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.15 
Furthermore, Article 85 of Protocol I declares that nearly all 
violations of distinction constitute grave breaches of the Protocol, 
including: 
(a) [m]aking the civilian population or individual 
civilians the object of attack; 
(b) [l]aunching an indiscriminate attack affecting the 
civilian population or civilian objects in the knowledge 
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to 
civilians or damage to civilian objects, as defined in 
Article 57, paragraph 2 (a)(iii); 
 . . . . 
(d) [m]aking non-defended localities and demilitarized 
zones the object of attack; [and]  
(e) [m]aking a person the object of attack in the 
knowledge that he is hors de combat . . . .16 
The Rome Statute similarly criminalizes attacks on civilians and 
indiscriminate attacks.17 
Finally, the principle of distinction mandates not only differentiation 
between civilians and combatants, but between civilian objects and 
military objects as well—a critical component of the protection of the 
civilian population during armed conflict.  Article 52(1) of Additional 
Protocol I declares that “[c]ivilian objects shall not be the object of attack 
or of reprisals,” and defines civilian objects as “all objects which are not 
military objectives.”18  The definition of military objectives in Article 52 
of Additional Protocol I demonstrates the framework for distinguishing 
between military and civilian objects:  “those objects which by their 
nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to 
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or 
                                                 
15 Id. at art. 51(4). 
16 Id. at art. 85. 
17 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 8(2)(b)(i)–(ii), 8(2)(b)(iv)–(vi), 
8(2)(e)(i)–(ii), 8(2)(e)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
18 AP I, supra note 1, art. 52(1). 
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neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite 
military advantage.”19 
Thus, beyond the obligation to differentiate between innocent 
civilians and persons who are fighting (and therefore can be targeted), 
the principle of distinction requires comparable determinations 
regarding the targeting of objects.  The obligation to target only military 
objectives is one means of implementing the age-old principle that the 
means and methods of warfare are not unlimited.20 
The prohibition on attacks against civilian objects is a necessary and 
inherent complement to the prohibition on attacks on civilians and the 
civilian population.  For example, schools and residential areas are 
immune from attack unless used for military purposes to the extent that 
they qualify as military objectives.  The Commentary on the Additional 
Protocols explains that many civilian objects are or “can become useful 
objects to the armed forces.  Thus, for example, a school or a hotel is a 
civilian object, but if . . . used to accommodate troops or headquarters 
staff, [it will] become [a] military objective[].”21  For example, during 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States attacked, among other 
buildings, the Baath Party Headquarters, which at first blush appeared 
to be a civilian object.  Yet, Iraqi forces were firing at U.S. troops from 
                                                 
19 Id. at art. 52(2). 
20 The modern version of this principle appears in Article 35 of Additional Protocol I; 
earlier formulations appear in the writings of Vitoria, Grotius, and Vattel, as well as in 
early codifications of the laws of war.  St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 10; LAWS OF 
WAR ON LAND art. 4 (1880 Oxford Manual) art. 4, available at www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/ 
140?OpenDocument; LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 16, at 8; 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF 
WAR AND PEACE (Francis W. Kelsey trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1964) (1646); EMMERICH DE 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW (Charles G. Fenwick 
trans., Carnegie Institute of Washington 1916) (1785); FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET 
DE IVRE BELLI REFLECTIONES (John Pawley Bate trans., Ocean Publ’ns 1964) (1557). 
21 YVES SANDOZ, CHRISTOPHE SWINARSKI, BRUNO ZIMMERMANN, COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 
2022 (1987); see CIHL, supra note 11, at 236 (citing AUSTRALIA, DEFENCE FORCE MANUAL 
§ 530 (1994)) (“For example, if enemy soldiers use a school building as shelter from attack 
by direct fire, then they are clearly gaining a military advantage from the school.  This 
means the school becomes a military objective and can be attacked.”); id. at 237 (citing 
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, NATIONAL DEFENCE OF CANADA, THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS 4–5 (2001)) (“[W]here a 
civilian object is used for military purposes, it loses its protection as a civilian object and 
may become a legitimate target.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 238 (citing 
NETHERLANDS, MILITARY MANUAL, at V-3 (1993)) (noting civilian buildings can become 
military objectives if, for example, they house combatants or are used as commando posts); 
see also AIR FORCE PAMPHLET, supra note 13, § 5-3(b)(2) (“The inherent nature of the object is 
not controlling since even a traditionally civilian object, such as a civilian house, can be a 
military objective when it is occupied and used by military forces during an armed 
engagement.”). 
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within and near the building, and a weapons cache was subsequently 
found inside the facility.22  This episode shows how actual use is a 
critical component to understanding whether a building is a legitimate 
target and to distinguishing between military and civilian objects.  Even 
though the Additional Protocol I emphasizes, importantly, that all 
doubts as to the civilian or military nature of an object should be 
resolved in favor of civilian status, the actual use of a building must be 
taken into account in distinguishing between civilian and military objects 
in targeting determinations. 
Some objects enjoy additional special protection under LOAC, 
including hospitals, religious and cultural property, the environment, 
objects indispensable for the civilian population, and works and 
installations containing dangerous forces (such as dams or nuclear 
power generating stations).  Beyond the general protection these 
buildings and sites have as civilian objects, they benefit from additional 
protections as set forth in Articles 53–56 of Additional Protocol I as a 
further means of protecting both the civilian population and its ability to 
survive during and after conflict.  In particular, the LOAC prohibits the 
use of such objects for military purposes.  In situations where they are 
used for military purposes (in violation of the law) and meet the test for 
military objectives, the attacking party is obligated to follow further 
precautions and only attack in restricted circumstances. 
Several of these categories have recognized protective emblems that 
mark objects as deserving of special protection under the law.  For 
medical and religious objects and personnel, the recognized emblems 
are:  (1) the Red Cross; (2) the Red Crescent; and (3) the newly-added 
Red Crystal.23  Cultural property is marked by a shield, as denoted in the 
1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, and works and installations 
containing dangerous forces are marked with three bright orange 
circles.24 
Through this framework for differentiating between civilians and 
fighters, between civilian objects and military objectives, LOAC 
transforms the spirit and purpose of the principle of distinction into 
                                                 
22 Michael N. Schmitt, The Conduct of Hostilities During Operation Iraqi Freedom:  An 
International Humanitarian Law Assessment, 6 Y.B. INT’L HUM. L. 73 (2003) (citing US 
CENTCOM News Release No. 03-03-105, U.S. Marines Destroy Ba’ath Party Headquarters 
(Mar. 31, 2003)). 
23 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 1 
[hereinafter AP III].  Israel uses the Red Star of David, which is protected as a matter of 
practice. 
24 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 
arts. 16−17, Apr. 9, 1956, 249 U.N.T.S. 215; AP I, supra note 1, annex I, art. 16. 
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concrete obligations and protections.  And yet, as the following section 
highlights, modern conflicts continue to impose extraordinary strain on 
distinction and pose grave threats to civilians and civilian protection. 
B. Contemporary Challenges for Distinction 
In traditional conflicts, one could distinguish between soldiers—who 
wore uniforms—and civilians—who typically did not venture near the 
battlefield—in most circumstances.  Similarly, identifying military and 
civilian objects was usually feasible.  Contemporary conflicts introduce a 
whole new set of challenges in this area, however, demanding ever-
greater efforts—through intelligence-gathering and surveillance—to 
determine who is who in the zone of combat operations.  It is precisely 
because of the lack of boundaries between conflict areas and civilian 
areas—between those who are actively participating in hostilities and 
those who are not—that today’s conflicts pose particular challenges for 
distinction.  In addition, modern warfare is increasingly characterized by 
asymmetry in the military capabilities of the parties, which adds to these 
challenges.  As such asymmetry grows, “the disadvantaged party has an 
incentive to blur the distinction between its forces and the civilian 
population in the hope that this will deter the other side from attack.”25 
Critical to the implementation of distinction in all situations is the 
identification of targets—both planned targets and dynamic targets.  A 
lawful attack must be directed at a legitimate target:  either a combatant, 
a civilian directly participating in hostilities, or a military object.  In 
international armed conflicts—those occurring between states—all 
members of a state’s regular armed forces are combatants and can be 
identified by the uniform they wear, among other characteristics.  In 
state versus non-state actor conflicts, including counterterrorism 
operations within the context of an armed conflict, determining who is a 
legitimate target is significantly more complex.  The legal obligation 
remains the same, however, requiring parties to distinguish between an 
innocent civilian and an individual who, although dressed in civilian 
attire, may pose an immediate threat, and is therefore a legitimate target.  
In addition, a commander must assess whether and when to target 
identifiably hostile persons deliberately hiding among the civilian 
population. 
                                                 
25 Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact of High Tech and Low Tech Warfare on Distinction, in 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE 21ST CENTURY’S CONFLICTS:  CHANGES AND 
CHALLENGES 169, 178 (Roberta Arnold & Pierre-Antoine Hildbrand eds., 2005). 
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Persons who are members of an organized armed group are 
legitimate targets at all times26—but dress the same as civilians either 
due to a lack of uniforms or specifically in order to blend into the civilian 
population for protection.  A second category of legitimate target, as 
noted above, is the civilian directly participating in hostilities.  The 
concept of what constitutes direct participation has been the subject of 
extensive analysis and debate and is outside the scope of this Article.27  
Nonetheless, regardless of the particular parameters of direct 
participation, the essence of the targeting determination in this situation 
is the notion that persons directly participating in hostilities—whether 
all the time or only once or intermittently—must be distinguished from 
innocent civilians.  When neither hostile persons nor members of armed 
groups wear uniforms or carry their arms openly, differentiating 
between legitimate targets and innocent civilians is extraordinarily 
difficult and fraught with danger for both the soldier and the innocent 
civilian. 
U.S. and NATO forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have been wrestling 
with the difficult legal and moral questions contemporary conflict raises 
for nearly a decade and continue to face complicated questions about 
who to target, how to target, and when to target.  For example, as one 
news article explained about combat in Afghanistan: 
The elusive insurgents blend easily into the population, 
invisible to Marines until they pick up a weapon.  They 
use villagers to spot and warn of U.S. troop movements, 
take up positions in farmers’ homes and fields, and 
attack Marines from spots with ready escape routes. 
                                                 
26 See Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities 
Under International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 991 (2008) (adopted by ICRC 
Assembly Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.cicr.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/review-
872−991 [hereinafter Interpretive Guidance] (stating that organized armed groups are 
targetable based on status in non-international armed conflict); see also JIMMY GURULÉ & 
GEOFFREY S. CORN, PRINCIPLES OF COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW 70−76 (2011) (discussing the 
rules governing targeting of enemy forces in international and non-international armed 
conflict and noting that (1) “a member of an enemy force . . . is presumed hostile and 
therefore presumptively subject to attack” in international armed conflict, and (2) 
“[s]ubjecting members of organized belligerent groups to status based targeting pursuant 
to the LOAC as opposed to civilians who periodically lose their protection from attack 
seems both logical and consistent with the practice of states engaged in non-international 
armed conflicts”). 
27 Interpretive Guidance, supra note 26; see HCJ 769/02 Public Committee against Torture 
in Israel v. Government of Israel (Targeted Killings Case) 57(6) IsrSC [2006]; Forum, The 
ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under 
International Humanitarian Law, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637 (2010). 
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 The Marines, under strict rules to protect civilians, 
must wait for insurgents to attack and then attempt to 
ensnare them.  Limited in their use of airstrikes and 
artillery—because of the danger to civilians and because 
aircraft often frighten the Taliban away—Marine 
riflemen must use themselves as bait and then engage in 
the riskier task of pursuing insurgents on foot.28 
Similarly, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraqi insurgents 
commonly wore civilian clothing when approaching American and 
British forces in order to get closer without seeming to present a threat.29  
Perhaps most nefariously, insurgent groups that employ suicide 
bombing as a tactic have now turned to the use of women and children—
for they have proven more likely to evade measures designed to identify 
suicide bombers.30 
In all of these situations, the great fluidity between hostile persons 
and innocent civilians and the conscious blending of hostile persons into 
the civilian population makes the task of identifying legitimate targets 
nearly impossible.31  Insurgents take advantage of this dilemma every 
day to gain an edge over the superior fighting capabilities of state forces.  
In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban regularly “use a tactic of 
engaging coalition forces from positions that expose Afghan civilians to 
danger.”32  This tactic is designed to force U.S. troops to either hold their 
                                                 
28 Ann Scott Tyson, In Afghanistan, a Test of Tactics Under Strict Rules to Protect Civilians, 
Marines Face More Complex Missions, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2009, at A6. 
29 Id.; see Official:  Afghan Militants Fled Dressed as Women, CNN.COM (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/asiapcf/07/06/afghanistan.marine.standoff/index.
html (discussing how insurgents locked in a standoff with U.S. marines disguised 
themselves as women in order to escape). 
30 See, e.g., Dan Abrams, Turning a Blind Eye to Child Suicide Bombers, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 
26, 2004, 11:37 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4601244; Child Bombers-in-Training 
Arrested in Iraq, UPI.COM (Apr. 21, 2009, 11:14 AM), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/ 
2009/04/21/Child-bombers-in-training-arrested-in-Iraq/UPI-48761240326883/; Cassandra 
Clifford, The Battle for Suicide Bombers, FOREIGN POL’Y BLOGS NETWORK (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://children.foreignpolicyblogs.com/category/suicide-bombers/; Pakistan:  Taliban 
Buying Children for Suicide Attacks, CNN.COM (July 7, 2009), http://edition.cnn.com/2009/ 
WORLD/asiapcf/07/07/pakistan.child.bombers/index.html (explaining that “young 
suicide bombers may be able to reach targets unnoticed”). 
31 Laurie R. Blank & Amos N. Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks:  Operationalizing 
the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 65–66 (2010). 
32 Jim Garamone, Directive Re-emphasizes Protecting Afghan Civilians, U.S. AIR FORCE (July 
6, 2009), http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123157435; see UNITED NATIONS 
ASSISTANCE MISSION TO AFGHANISTAN, HUMAN RIGHTS UNIT, AFGHANISTAN:  MID YEAR 
BULLETIN ON PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 35 (2009), available at 
http://unama.unmissions.org/portals/unama/human%20rights/09july31-unama-human-
rights-civilian-casualties-mid-year-2009-bulletin.pdf (“In several cases investigated by 
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fire in the face of an attack or endanger innocent civilians—a lose-lose 
situation. By not distinguishing themselves from civilians—thus 
violating the principle of distinction—these militants deliberately create 
such situations.  Israel’s conflicts, particularly those with Hezbollah in 
Lebanon in 2006 and with Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups in 
Gaza from December 2008 through January 2009, offer an equally searing 
commentary about the nature of asymmetrical war.  Indeed, in the Gaza 
Strip, “one of the most densely populated tracts of land in the world,”33 
where militants intermingle with the civilian population, store munitions 
in residential buildings, hospitals, and mosques, and launch rockets from 
farmers’ fields and residential rooftops, the implementation of LOAC 
faces one of its gravest tests. Faced with Hamas militants firing from 
schools, storing munitions in mosques, and using hospitals as command 
posts, Israeli troops encounter many of the same challenging decisions as 
U.S. troops in Afghanistan. 
In all of these situations, the failure of some groups and/or 
individuals—whether state or non-state actors—to distinguish 
themselves from civilians creates ever-greater dangers for the civilian 
population caught in the conflict zone.  The purposeful mixing with 
civilians and use of the civilian population as a shield only exacerbates 
these dangers.  For this reason, it is essential to focus not only on the 
need to implement distinction in targeting as effectively as possible, but 
also to enforce accountability for violations of distinction in conduct. 
III.  IMPLEMENTING DISTINCTION IN TARGETING AND IN CONDUCT 
Legal obligations in targeting receive significant attention during 
dissemination, training, decision-making, and post-hoc accountability.  
There is little doubt that training troops—whether fighter pilots, 
infantrymen, or artillery units—in how to carry out the legal obligation 
to distinguish between legitimate targets and innocent civilians 
protected from attack is central to the lawful conduct of hostilities.  
Accountability for violations of these obligations is equally important, 
and has been a key focus of the international and hybrid tribunals over 
                                                                                                             
[United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan], it is apparent that important 
traditional codes of hospitality and power imbalances inhibit the ability of villagers living 
in areas with a strong [anti-government element] presence to refuse shelter to an [anti-
government element] commander or his men.  Information indicates that [anti-government 
elements] take advantage of these factors to use civilian houses as cover, to deter [pro-
government force] raids, or to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties if raided by [pro-
government forces], potentially violating international humanitarian law.”). 
33 Key Maps, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/ 
v3_israel_palestinians/maps/html/population_settlements.stm (last visited Mar. 29, 2012). 
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the past decade or longer.  But these efforts only tell part of the story and 
tackle part of the problem.  Fighters who launch attacks in civilian 
clothing, from protected civilian sites, and use civilians as shields are 
violating LOAC and must be held accountable for their conduct.  Until 
then, distinction will only be enforced halfway. 
A. Operationalizing Distinction 
On the battlefield, the critical determination is between those who 
can be attacked and those who cannot.  Combatant status does provide 
one lens for making this determination:  All members of the opposing 
armed forces are legitimate targets of attack at all times.  Other 
individuals, such as members of militia groups and civilians directly 
participating in hostilities, are legitimate targets but are significantly 
harder to identify.  Operationalizing distinction in the zone of combat 
thus requires extensive training and the use of intelligence to help 
understand who is an innocent civilian deserving of protection and who 
is a hostile actor posing a legitimate threat. 
In practice, military forces implement distinction through rules of 
engagement (“ROE”) that set forth the parameters for the use of force 
during armed conflict.  ROE are “[d]irectives issued by competent 
military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under 
which [U.S.] forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement 
with other forces encountered.”34  In most conflicts between states or 
readily identifiable armed groups, the ROE will declare the enemy force 
hostile, meaning that any member of such force is a legitimate target.35  
Thus, Iraqi military forces and certain paramilitary groups were declared 
hostile for Operation Iraqi Freedom.36  ROE for Operation Iraqi Freedom 
designated the following “groups and organizations . . . as paramilitary 
forces that may be considered hostile and engaged” and destroyed:  
Special Republican Guard, Ba’ath Party Militia, Fedayeen Sadaam, Al 
                                                 
34 DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBL’N 1-02, DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED 
TERMS (2010), as amended through 15 February 2012, available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; see INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW 
DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, JA-422, OPERATIONAL 
LAW HANDBOOK 73 (2010) [hereinafter OP LAW HANDBOOK]. 
35 See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01A, Standing Rules of 
Engagement (SROE) for U.S. Forces (2000) Enclosure A, 6 [hereinafter SROE] (“Once a force 
is declared hostile by appropriate authority, US units need not observe a hostile act or a 
demonstration of hostile intent before engaging that force.”). 
36 CENTER FOR LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL 
CENTER & SCHOOL, LEGAL LESSONS LEARNED FROM AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ:  VOLUME I, 
MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (11 SEPTEMBER 2001 TO 1 MAY 2003), at 98 (2004) [hereinafter 
CLAMO], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/clamo-v1.pdf. 
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Quds, and others.37  Identifying who fell into these groups was then the 
key issue for determining who was a legitimate target. 
In contrast, in Afghanistan, the ROE for Operation Enduring 
Freedom did not declare any forces hostile by status.  One reason was 
simply the challenge in defining the contours of the enemy groups: 
First, it was difficult to determine who exactly was a 
hostile force in Afghanistan.  The Taliban was an 
amorphously defined group comprised of the Taliban 
regime itself as well as their armed units, various 
members of which were not committed to any cause and 
willingly switched allegiances.  Al Qaeda members 
similarly were difficult to define.38 
Second, status-based targeting did not fit as well with the 
counterinsurgency goals of the mission.  In both Afghanistan and Iraq, as 
in all military operations, the ROE provided for the use of deadly force in 
self-defense in response to a hostile act or exhibited hostile intent, as set 
forth in the U.S. Standing Rules of Engagement (“SROE”), which is the 
ROE for all military operations short of declared war or prolonged 
conflict.39 
In conflicts where status-based targeting gives way to conduct-based 
targeting due to the inherent difficulties of differentiating among 
persons in the zone of combat, the concepts of hostile act and hostile 
intent demonstrate how distinction is operationalized in practice.  As one 
Marine Staff Judge Advocate explained in an After Action Report:  
“‘What does a Taliban or Al Qa[e]da fighter look like?  Can you 
determine the enemy’s identity by the equipment they use?  These and 
other questions were often unanswerable, even when based on the most 
current intelligence available.’”40  As a result, the conduct analysis 
inherent in hostile act and hostile intent prove to be the predominant 
method of identifying hostile persons in Afghanistan and other combat 
                                                 
37 ANNEX E (CONSOLIDATED ROE) TO 3-187 FRAGO 02, OPORD 02-005, 
http://www.expose-the-war-profiteers.org/archive/government/2005/20050000.pdf 
[hereinafter IRAQ ROE]. 
38 CLAMO, supra note 36, at 101. 
39 SROE, supra note 35, Enclosure A, 1(c)(1).  See generally CLAMO, supra note 36 (noting 
that the ROE include authorization for the use of force in self-defense); IRAQ ROE, supra 
note 37, at 3.A.(2)–(3) (stating that commanders have inherent authority and an obligation 
to respond in self-defense to hostile acts or demonstrations of hostile intent). 
40 CLAMO, supra note 36, at 98 (citing Major Ian D. Brasure, Staff Judge Advocate, 26th 
Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), After Action Report:  Operation 
Enduring Freedom/Operation Swift Freedom ¶ (3)(b) (Mar. 22, 2002)). 
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areas where fighters look like civilians and the two are mingled together 
in civilian areas. 
The SROE define “[h]ostile [a]ct” as: 
An attack or other use of force against the United States, 
US forces, and, in certain circumstances, US nationals, 
their property, US commercial assets, and/or other 
designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their 
property.  It is also force used directly to preclude or 
impede the mission and/or duties of US forces, 
including the recovery of US personnel and vital US 
Government property . . . .41 
The ROE for Operation Iraqi Freedom offer several examples of hostile 
acts, including:  “releasing, launching, or firing missiles, guns, rockets, 
directed-energy weapons or any other weapons against US Forces; 
laying mines; attacking or taking control of information systems critical 
to military employment or national infrastructure.”42  Hostile intent is 
defined as the threat of imminent use of force against the same interests 
listed in the definition of hostile act above.  External factors such as “the 
state of international or regional political tension, military preparations, 
intelligence, and indication and warning information” will all play a role 
in determining the existence of hostile intent.43 
Evidence of hostile intent is considered to exist when a 
foreign force or terrorist(s):  is detected to maneuver into 
a weapon launch position; is preparing to fire, launch or 
release weapons against the US, US Forces, and in 
certain circumstances, US nationals and their property, 
or US commercial assets; is preparing to lay mines; or 
attempts to gain control of information systems critical 
to military employment or national infrastructure.44 
Finally, the ROE for Operation Enduring Freedom (“OEF ROE”) in 
Afghanistan added a new component to the determination of legitimate 
targets—and thus to the process of discrimination between such targets 
and innocent civilians protected from attack.  OEF ROE added the 
criterion of “likely and identifiable threat” (“LIT”):  “[C]ertain enemy 
forces who posed a likely and identifiable threat to friendly forces could 
                                                 
41 SROE, supra note 35, at 5(g). 
42 IRAQ ROE, supra note 37, at 3.H.(6). 
43 Id. at 3.H.(7). 
44 Id. 
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be considered hostile and engaged and destroyed.”45  The idea was to 
allow the U.S. military and allied forces to target potential threats that 
could arise during the conduct of military operations—in addition to 
actual or imminent threats—thus creating a middle ground between a 
declaration of hostile force and a self-defense based authorization of the 
use of force. 
During the course of operations, therefore, militaries have a range of 
tools for implementing distinction to comport with their obligations 
under LOAC.  The nature of contemporary conflicts and the tactics of 
militants make this task exponentially harder.  As a result, effective 
military operations will continually demand additional efforts and new 
tools for operationalizing distinction and other LOAC principles, so as to 
maximize protection of innocent civilians while still enabling mission 
fulfillment.46 
B. Enforcing Distinction:  Accountability for Attacks on Civilians 
The prohibition on attacks against civilians is the most fundamental 
component of distinction.  As the Commentary to Additional Protocol I 
explains, the prohibition in Article 51 “explicitly confirms the customary 
rule that innocent civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as 
possible and enjoy general protection against danger arising from 
hostilities.”47  Unlawful attacks on civilians include both deliberate and 
indiscriminate attacks.  For example, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court criminalizes both types of attacks:  
intentional attacks directed against civilians and attacks made in the 
knowledge that civilian casualties would be clearly excessive in relation 
to the military advantage gained—that is, attacks that violate the 
principle of proportionality.48 
                                                 
45 CLAMO, supra note 36, at 100. 
46 See Blank & Guiora, supra note 31 (setting out a framework for operationalizing LOAC 
in response to the challenges of contemporary conflicts). 
47 SANDOZ ET AL., supra note 21, at 615. 
48 Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 8.  Defining “‘war crimes’” as: 
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in 
international armed conflict, within the established framework of 
international law, namely, any of the following acts: 
 (i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population 
as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in 
hostilities; 
  . . .  
 (iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such 
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage 
to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
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The ICTY has extensive jurisprudence on the prosecution of 
deliberate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and has consistently 
reinforced “that there is an absolute prohibition on the targeting of 
civilians in customary international law.”49  In particular, the ICTY has 
repeatedly reaffirmed “that a violation of the principle prohibiting 
attacks on civilians entails individual criminal responsibility.”50  The 
elements of the crime of unlawful attacks on civilians and civilian 
property track the obligations of distinction.  As the ICTY held in 
Prosecutor v. Galic, the crime of attacks on civilians consists of the 
following elements: 
1.  Acts of violence directed against the civilian 
population or individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities causing death or serious injury to body or 
health within the civilian population. 
2.  The offender wilfully [sic] made the civilian 
population or individual civilians not taking direct part 
in hostilities the object of those acts of violence.51 
In Galic, the Bosnian Serb army laid siege to Sarajevo and engaged in 
a protracted campaign of sniping and shelling the civilian population 
over the course of three years.  Certainly, deliberate attacks on civilians 
violate the principle of distinction.  Indiscriminate attacks and 
disproportionate attacks on civilians do so as well because, in such cases, 
the perpetrator willfully or recklessly disregards the presence of civilians 
when launching an attack.  The ICTY thus emphasized, in Prosecutor v. 
Kupreskic, “the sacrosanct character of the duty to protect civilians”—
even when interspersed in a city or town with combatants or other 
armed elements.52 
National courts, national criminal codes, and military manuals also 
criminalize attacks on civilians.  Perhaps the most emphatic statement of 
the prohibition on attacks against civilians and the universality of that 
norm appears in the court-martial of Lieutenant William Calley after the 
My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War.  Finding Lieutenant Calley 
                                                                                                             
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 
Id. 
49 Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 109 (Int’l Crim. Trib. 
for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 
50 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 29 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-AR72, Decision 
on Interlocutory Appeal, ¶ 10 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 22, 2002). 
51 Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 56. 
52 Prosecutor v. Kuprei, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 513 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2002). 
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guilty of the murder of innocent men, women, and children, the U.S. 
Court of Military Appeals stated that “kill[ing] infants and unarmed 
civilians who were so demonstrably incapable of resistance to the armed 
might of a military force . . . is . . . palpably illegal.”53  Countries around 
the world have incorporated the war crime of attacks on civilians into 
their penal codes and codes of military justice.54  In military manuals and 
military training, protection of civilians from attack is often the first rule.  
Thus, “‘The Soldier’s Rules’” start with the phrase “[s]oldiers fight only 
enemy combatants,” a direct incorporation of the prohibition on attacks 
against civilians into military training and teaching.55  The United 
Kingdom Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict details extensively the 
categories of war crimes, including attacks on civilians and other 
violations of distinction in targeting, and the nature of individual 
criminal responsibility for war crimes.56 
                                                 
53 United States v.  Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 544 (Dec. 21, 1973). 
54 See Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 31, n.47, citing the following statutes: 
Law of 16 June 1993 relative to the repression of serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, Belgium, Chapter 1§ 3, No.11; 
Swedish Penal Code, Chap. 22, § 6, No. 3 and 4 (1990); Hungarian 
Criminal Code, Chapter XI, Section 160 (1978); Philippine Criminal 
Code, Article 334 (1964); Criminal Code of Mozambique, Article 83 
(1987); Italian Criminal Military Code of War, Article 185 (1941); 
Spanish Penal Code, Article 611 (1) (1995); Croatian Penal Code, 
Article 120 (1) (1991). 
Id. 
55 DEP’T OF THE ARMY, AR 350-1, ARMY TRAINING AND LEADER DEVELOPMENT ¶ G-12(b) 
(2009). 
56 UK LAW OF WAR MANUAL, CH. 16, § G.  Many other national military manuals do as 
well, as the ICTY Trial Chamber noted in the Galic judgment.  Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, 
Judgment, ¶ 31, n.50, citing the following: 
United States Field Manual No. 27-10:  The Law of Land Warfare, para. 
25 (1976); United Kingdom Manual of Military Law, chap. 4, para. 88 
(1958); German Military Manual (Humanitäres Völkrerrecht in 
bewaffnetenKonflikten-Handbuch), paras 404 and 451 (1992) (English 
translation available at ICTY library); Canadian Law of Armed Conflict 
at the Operational and Tactical Level, Section 4, paras 15 and 22 (1992); 
Dutch “Soldiers Handbook” (Handboek voor de Soldaat), VS 2-1350, 
Chapter VII, Art. 34 (1974); Australian Law of Armed Conflict 
Commander’s Guide (ADFP 37 Supplement 1), para. 1302 (1994); New 
Zealand Interim Law of Armed Conflict Manual, para. 517 (1992); 
Canadian Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical 
Level, Section 4, paras 15, 22 (1992); Soviet Minister of Defence Order 
No. 75 of 16 February 1990 on the Publication of the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Victims of 
War and their Additional Protocols (1990), art. 8, para. (f) (French 
translation available at the ICRC’s web site:  <http://www.icrc.org>.). 
Id. 
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All of these tools for criminalizing attacks on civilians and ensuring 
individual criminal responsibility for such attacks play a critical role in 
the implementation and enforcement of the obligations of the principle 
of distinction.  Individuals who disregard this fundamental obligation 
and target civilians—whether deliberately or indiscriminately—can face 
criminal prosecution and individual accountability for their actions.  
Unfortunately, direct targeting of civilians remains far too prevalent in 
today’s conflicts, but these efforts at individual accountability continue 
to make inroads into the protection of civilians and the punishment of 
those who fail to adhere to these standards.  Without more, however, as 
detailed below, these efforts at operationalizing and accountability are 
only half the battle. 
C. Enforcing Distinction in the Conduct of Fighters 
The tragically all-too-common practices of fighters disguising 
themselves as civilians, launching attacks from and locating military 
objectives in civilian areas, and using civilians as human shields raise 
grave concerns for the implementation of LOAC.  These tactics violate 
LOAC and also increase the danger that civilians face during armed 
conflict.  Still worse, in many contemporary conflicts, militants or weaker 
states fighting against more powerful states use these tactics to achieve 
broader strategic purposes by increasing civilian casualties—such as 
diminished civilian support for the war effort, claims of war crimes by 
the stronger military, or strategic and policy limitations on the use of 
force that impact the outcome of the conflict.  Enforcing the obligations 
of distinction at the tactical level of the conduct of militants and fighters 
thus goes well beyond the protection of civilians in the immediate 
vicinity of and affected by a particular incident—it can have substantial 
consequences for the protection of civilians writ large during conflict.  
And yet, as the discussion below demonstrates, little to no effort is made 
to hold fighters accountable—or even to condemn their failure to 
distinguish themselves from innocent civilians and for their use of the 
civilian population for their own gain in direct contravention of LOAC’s 
fundamental principles. 
1. Perfidious Attacks 
News stories from Afghanistan, Gaza, Lebanon, Colombia, and a 
number of other conflict areas repeatedly tell of persons fighting in 
civilian clothes.  Indeed, this characteristic of contemporary conflict 
presents perhaps the greatest challenge to LOAC-compliant militaries:  If 
a soldier cannot tell who is an innocent civilian and who is a hostile 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 3 [2012], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol46/iss3/3
2012] Accountability for Failing to Distinguish 785 
person, distinguishing and identifying legitimate targets is an 
extraordinarily complex and difficult task.  But it remains essential to the 
lawful conduct of military operations. 
Simply fighting in civilian clothing or without a formal uniform is 
not in and of itself a violation of LOAC.  Civilians who take part in 
hostilities do not run afoul of the law just by picking up a gun or firing a 
rocket.  Rather, the immediate consequence of civilian participation in 
hostilities is that such persons lose their immunity from attack and 
become lawful targets of attack.57  When individuals deliberately use the 
appearance of protected status in order to launch an attack, however, 
they violate the law. 
In many cases across a range of conflicts, fighters specifically exploit 
the protections LOAC grants to civilians in order to gain an advantage in 
attacking the state party or the more powerful party in the conflict.  The 
traditional definition of perfidy is “[t]o kill or wound treacherously 
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,” as set forth in 
Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague Convention.58  Suicide bombers 
disguising themselves as civilians to gain closer access to military 
checkpoints or other locations is a prime example of killing 
“treacherously.”  Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I offers a more 
comprehensive formulation, forbidding killing, capturing, or injuring the 
enemy “by resort to perfidy.”59  In particular, the Protocol states that 
“[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that 
he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that 
confidence, shall constitute perfidy.”60  Based on notions of honor, this 
prohibition unquestionably forms part of customary international law.61 
                                                 
57 See AP I, supra note 1, art. 51(3). 
58 Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex:  
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 23(b), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 
Stat. 2277, T.S. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV].  The prohibition of killing treacherously goes 
back to the Lieber Code, which states that military necessity “admits of deception, but 
disclaims acts of perfidy.”  LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 16, at 8. 
59 AP I, supra note 1, art. 37(1).  Examples of perfidy in Article 37(1)(a)–(d) include 
feigning truce or surrender, feigning civilian status, or feigning protected status by using 
emblems of the U.N. or neutral states. 
60 Id. (emphasis added). 
61 YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 199 (2004); Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International 
Humanitarian Law, 62 A.F. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2008) (citing NWP 1-14M, ¶ 12.7); see INT’L & 
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, JA-
423, LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 192 (Keith E. Puls ed., 2005), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/law-war-handbook-2005.pdf; SAN REMO 
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA Rule 111 (June 
12, 1994);  see also CIHL, supra note 11, Rule 65 (stating that the prohibition on perfidy is a 
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As the Commentary to the Additional Protocols explains, “[t]he 
central element of the definition of perfidy is the deliberate claim to legal 
protection for hostile purposes.  The enemy attacks under cover of the 
protection accorded by humanitarian law . . . .”62  Thus, when fighters 
intentionally disguise themselves as civilians to lead soldiers on the 
opposing side to believe that they need not take defensive action to 
guard against attack, they commit perfidy.  It is important to distinguish 
such perfidious attacks from legitimate ruses of war, which also involve 
deception, but do not violate LOAC. 
Ruses are legitimate tools of warfare; the Lieber Code states that 
“deception in war is admitted as a just and necessary means of 
hostility . . . consistent with honorable warfare . . . .”63  The key difference 
between a ruse and perfidy is that the latter must involve a deliberate 
attempt to benefit from the protections of LOAC by inducing the other 
side to believe that one is protected under LOAC.  Examples of ruses 
include:  (1) camouflaging a tank so that the enemy does not see it; (2) 
using disinformation to lead the enemy to believe that the attack will 
take place at a different time or a different place; or (3) faking 
communications to suggest the presence of multiple units or a larger 
force.  Thus, it is not the act of hiding from the enemy or making oneself 
less noticeable that is the essence of perfidy, but the use of what appears 
to be protected status.  “A soldier may attempt to become invisible in the 
landscape [by wearing a camouflage uniform], but not in a crowd [by 
pretending to be a civilian].”64  The indirect consequence of such actions 
is that civilians are placed at greater risk, since soldiers previously 
attacked by fighters disguised as civilians may be more likely to view 
those who appear to be civilians as dangerous and respond accordingly. 
Past and present conflicts offer numerous examples of perfidious 
conduct.  Suicide bombing—a classic example of perfidy, as noted 
above—is a regular tactic of numerous terrorist and insurgent groups in 
conflicts from Sri Lanka to Gaza to Pakistan.  The Tamil Tigers in Sri 
Lanka, formally known as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(“LTTE”), are the “fathers of modern-day suicide bombing,” and they 
                                                                                                             
long-standing rule of customary international law in both international and non-
international armed conflicts). 
62 SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 435 (footnote omitted) (“The definition is based on three 
elements:  inviting the confidence of an adversary, the intent to betray that confidence 
(subjective element) and to betray it on a specific point, the existence of the protection 
afforded by international law applicable in armed conflict (objective element).”). 
63 LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, art. 101, at 31. 
64 GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT:  INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 
IN WAR 423 (2010). 
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accounted for one-third of all suicide bombings in the world in 2002.65  In 
most such attacks, the suicide bomber dresses as a civilian to gain better 
access to the target, such as a checkpoint or government building.  For 
example, in February 2009, a female insurgent dressed as a civilian blew 
herself up at a government checkpoint for civilians fleeing the conflict 
zone, killing twenty-eight people and wounding dozens of others.66 
After the conflict ended in May 2009, the United Nations (“U.N.”) 
Secretary General appointed a Panel of Experts to examine “the 
accountability obligations arising from the last stages of the war” and to 
assess “the ‘nature and scope of alleged violations.’”67  Among the 
hundred-plus pages of violations that the Panel details, it addresses a 
wide variety of violations of LOAC and human rights law, including the 
killing of civilians through suicide attacks.  After referring to “[c]redible 
allegations” of “a number of suicide attacks, both in and outside of the 
conflict zone, against civilians[,] . . . [t]he Panel notes that these attacks 
constitute a clear violation of the ban on intentional or indiscriminate 
attacks on civilians.”68  However, notwithstanding the fact that these 
suicide attacks also constitute perfidy—a violation of LOAC codified as 
far back as the Lieber Code—the Panel’s report does not even mention 
perfidy or the fact that the perpetrators of these suicide attacks are 
violating their obligations under the principle of distinction, with severe 
consequences for civilian protections.69 
One of the more widely reported and catastrophic examples of 
perfidy took place in Srebrenica in the summer of 1995.  As the Bosnian 
Serbs overran the U.N.’s safe haven of Srebrenica, thousands of Bosnian 
Muslims fled the city, seeking safety elsewhere.  As a long column of 
Bosnian Muslim men—who had been forcibly separated from their 
families—tried to reach Bosnian government territory and safety, they 
faced repeated attacks by Bosnian Serb forces.  Eventually, “Bosnian Serb 
soldiers wearing stolen UN uniforms and driving stolen U.N. vehicles 
announced over megaphones [that they were U.N. peacekeepers and 
that they were] prepared to oversee the Bosnian Muslims’ surrender and 
                                                 
65 Alex Perry, How Sri Lanka’s Rebels Build a Suicide Bomber, TIME (May 12, 2006), 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1193862,00.html. 
66 More Civilians Killed in Sri Lanka Fighting, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 10, 2009), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/more-civilians-killed-sri-lanka-
fighting-20090210. 
67 U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL’S PANEL OF EXPERTS 
ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN SRI LANKA i (Mar. 31, 2004) [hereinafter SRI LANKA REPORT]. 
68 Id. at 66. 
69 LIEBER CODE, supra note 9, at art. 16 (stating that military necessity “admits of 
deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy”). 
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guarantee they would not be harmed.”70  The Bosnian Muslim men 
surrendered; shortly thereafter, the Bosnian Serb forces killed all of them 
and buried them in mass graves.71 
The Bosnian Serbs’ conduct is a textbook example of perfidy:  They 
used the stolen U.N. uniforms and vehicles to gain the Bosnian Muslims’ 
confidence, induce their surrender, and then kill them.  None of the 
judgments of the ICTY involving crimes at Srebrenica discuss the 
violation of perfidy or directly condemn the Bosnian Serbs’ use of U.N. 
uniforms and vehicles to gain the confidence of the Bosnian Muslim men 
before killing them.  The crimes of genocide and crimes against 
humanity for which the perpetrators were held accountable are certainly 
far more heinous and far graver than perfidy, and the Tribunal’s focus 
was to prosecute the most serious crimes stemming from the war in the 
former Yugoslavia, making the omission of perfidy significantly less 
important than it otherwise might have been.  Nonetheless, a 
condemnation or even a recognition of the violation would contribute to 
the enforcement of accountability for this and other similar violations of 
distinction. 
During Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli military operation in the 
Gaza Strip from December 2008 to January 2009, Palestinian armed 
groups generally operated in civilian clothing and from civilian areas, 
enabling them to take advantage of the protections that LOAC affords 
civilians.  However, the Report of the U.N. Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict (“Goldstone Report”), which investigated allegations of 
violations during the conflict, does not even mention perfidy in 
discussing the activities of Hamas and other armed groups, instead 
completely ignoring the true nature of their practices.  The Goldstone 
                                                 
70 David Rohde, Perfidy and Treachery, CRIMES OF WAR, http://www.crimesofwar.org/a-
zguide/perfidy-and-treachery/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2012); see THE COMMISSION FOR 
INVESTIGATION OF THE EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, THE 
EVENTS IN AND AROUND SREBRENICA BETWEEN 10TH AND 19TH JULY 1995, at 15 (2004), 
available at http://trial-ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/Srebrenica_ 
Report2004.pdf [hereinafter MASSACRE AT SREBRENICA]; see also Prosecutor v. Karadzic & 
Mladic, Initial Indictment, IT-95-18-I, ¶ 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 
14, 1995) [hereinafter Karadzic & Mladic Indictment] (“In many instances, assurances of 
safety were provided to the Muslims by Bosnian Serb military personnel who were with 
other Bosnian Serb soldiers wearing stolen UN uniforms . . .”); SOLIS, supra note 64, at 431 
(describing how the Bosnian Serb soldiers wore U.N. uniforms to convince the Bosnian 
Muslims that they would be safe if they surrendered). 
71 Karadzic & Mladic Indictment, supra note 70, ¶¶ 19–20; MASSACRE AT SREBRENICA, 
supra note 70; John Grimond, Nowhere to Hide:  How Bosnian Serbs Executed 7,000 Muslims 
Under the Eyes of the U.N. and the World, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997, 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/05/11/reviews/970511.11grimont.html (reviewing 
DAVID ROHDE, ENDGAME:  THE BETRAYAL AND FALL OF SREBRENICA, EUROPE’S WORST 
MASSACRE SINCE WORLD WAR II (1997)). 
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Report recognizes that Palestinian armed groups fired rockets and 
mortars from urban areas, citing, for example, a January 2009 interview 
with three Palestinian militants in which they “stated that rockets and 
mortars were launched in close proximity to homes and alleyways in the 
hope that nearby civilians would deter Israel from responding.”72  
Similarly, the Goldstone Report also notes that members of Palestinian 
armed groups did not wear uniforms.  Instead, after “the start of the 
military operations, members of al-Qassam Brigades abandoned military 
dress and patrolled streets in civilian clothes.”73  Notwithstanding these 
preliminary statements, however, the Goldstone Report does not even 
address the question of intent to deceive through the use of civilian 
clothes.  “Palestinian militants were not just shielding the mortars from 
attack, but were attacking—firing mortars and rockets—while in civilian 
dress and while feigning civilian status—the fundamental element of 
perfidy.”74  The failure to address the practice of militants attacking 
while disguised as civilians essentially encourages militants to embed 
themselves within the civilian population.  After all, the Goldstone 
Report describes these exact tactics without identifying or condemning 
the LOAC violation at issue, effectively encouraging such tactics. 
When international prosecutions or investigations into LOAC 
violations disregard perfidious tactics—whether inadvertently, 
deliberately, or, more justifiably, in favor of more serious crimes—the 
effect is to ratify such tactics.  The absence of condemnation and 
accountability speaks volumes:  Perfidy becomes an accepted practice.  
For example: 
If a guerrilla movement were systematically to take 
advantage of the surprise element that lies in attacking 
while posing as civilians until—as one expert said “a 
split second before the attack”—it would inevitably 
undermine the presumption, which is vital to maintain, 
namely that apparently unarmed persons in civilian 
                                                 
72 U.N. Human Rights Council, Human Rights In Palestine And Other Occupied Arab 
Territories:  Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, ¶¶ 450–51, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Goldstone Report] (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
73 Id. ¶ 478 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
74 Laurie R. Blank, Finding Facts but Missing the Law:  The Goldstone Report, Gaza and 
Lawfare, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 280, 291 (2010) (citing Int’l Humanitarian Law Research 
Initiative, Legal Aspects of Suicide Attacks in IHL, in MONITORING INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN IRAQ).  “However, the fact that the attackers in recent suicide 
operations have posed as civilians and therefore concealed their combatant status 
constitutes an act of perfidy prohibited under IHL.”  Int’l Humanitarian Law Research 
Initiative, supra. 
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dress, do not attack.  The result of undermining or 
eliminating this presumption is bound to have dreadful 
consequences for the civilian population.75 
The true victims of this failure of enforcement and accountability are 
the innocent civilians:  (1) they are trapped—literally and figuratively—
in the conflict zone by fighters using them as cover for their perfidious 
tactics; and (2) they become the unintentional and tragic targets of 
soldiers who mistake them for legitimate targets when unable to 
distinguish between fighters and civilians. 
2. Hiding Military Objectives in the Civilian Population 
The obligation to distinguish is not limited to individuals, but 
governs the use of objects as well.  Recent conflicts in particular have 
involved extensive co-mingling of civilian and military objects, which 
poses a grave danger to civilians.  Insurgents and other fighters in 
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza, for example, make extensive use 
of civilian infrastructure to hide, store, and launch rockets, missiles, and 
other weapons.  In Afghanistan, Taliban militants have stored heavy 
weaponry in mosques and reportedly positioned two large anti-aircraft 
guns in front of the office of a major international humanitarian aid 
organization.76  Such conduct makes targeting decisions extraordinarily 
difficult given the obligations to minimize civilian casualties and operate 
within the framework of proportionality.  It also creates situations where 
a LOAC-compliant military often appears forced to choose between 
engaging a legitimate target and endangering civilians.  “By shifting 
soldiers and military equipment into civilian neighborhoods and taking 
refuge in mosques, archeological sites and other nonmilitary facilities, 
Taliban forces [confront] U.S. authorities with the choice of risking 
civilian casualties and destruction of treasured Afghan assets or forgoing 
attacks.”77 
These practices highlight the obligation of precautions—an essential 
component of how parties implement LOAC’s central purpose of 
                                                 
75 MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (1982); see 
Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493, 1497 (2004) 
(“[T]he goal of protecting innocent civilians . . . requires a sharp line between combatants 
and non-combatants.”). 
76 See, e.g., Mark Mazzetti & Kevin Whitelaw, Into the Thick of Things, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Nov. 5, 2001 (“Heavy weaponry is being sheltered in several mosques to deter 
attacks.  The Taliban has even placed a tank and two large antiaircraft guns under trees in 
front of the office of CARE International . . . .”). 
77 Bradley Graham & Vernon Loeb, Taliban Dispersal Slows U.S., WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 
2001, at 1. 
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protection of civilians during armed conflict.  In many ways, the 
identification of military objectives and the proportionality 
considerations are, of course, precautions.  But the obligations of the 
parties to a conflict to take precautionary measures go beyond that.  
Beginning at the broadest level, Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I 
states:  “In the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be 
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”78  
This provision is a direct outgrowth of, and supplement to, the Basic 
Rule in Article 48, which mandates that all parties distinguish between 
combatants and civilians and between military objects and civilian 
objects.  Although the obligation to take constant care is a general 
principle, it has important ramifications for the conduct of hostilities and 
the protection of civilians:  “It is quite clear that by respecting this 
obligation the Parties to the conflict will spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects.”79  Moreover, the obligations to take 
precautions are “not simply [comprised of] hortatory norms encouraging 
good practice.  They constitute obligatory standards of conduct whose 
violation would entail international responsibility.”80 
Most jurisprudence, news analyses, and legal commentary have 
focused on the attacking party’s obligation to take precautions in 
identifying targets and launching attacks.  Article 57 of Additional 
Protocol I sets forth precautions that attacking parties must take.  First, 
parties must refrain from launching attacks that violate the principle of 
proportionality, as detailed above.  Parties also must do everything 
feasible to ensure that targets are military objectives, and must choose 
the means and methods of attack with the aim of minimizing incidental 
civilian losses and damage.  When choosing between two possible 
attacks offering similar military advantages, parties must choose the 
objective that offers the least likely amount of harm to civilians and 
civilian objects.  Finally, the attacking party must, where feasible, give 
effective advance warning of attacks.  Failure to take the necessary 
precautions can render an attack unlawful, even if launched against a 
legitimate target.  For example, the European Court of Human Rights 
strongly criticized a Russian operation in a Chechen village for the 
failure to take any precautions for the protection of civilians in the 
planning or execution of the operation.  Although the attack may have 
been against a legitimate target—insurgents entrenched in the village—it 
was unlawful because the court found no evidence “that it was planned 
                                                 
78 AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(1). 
79 SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 680. 
80 Jean-Francois Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the Conduct of Hostilities, 
88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 794 (2006). 
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and executed with the requisite care for the lives of the civilian 
population.”81 
However, importantly, Article 57’s emphasis on the attacking party’s 
obligations does not in any way diminish the defending party’s 
obligations.82  Instead, the obligation to take precautions extends to the 
defending party as well.  Article 58, entitled “Precautions against the 
effects of attacks,” requires parties to: 
(a) . . . endeavour to remove the civilian population, 
individual civilians and civilian objects under their 
control from the vicinity of military objectives;  
(b) [a]void locating military objectives within or near 
densely populated areas; [and]  
(c) [t]ake the other necessary precautions to protect the 
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian 
objects under their control against the dangers resulting 
from military operations.83 
As the Commentary to Additional Protocol I explains, “[b]elligerents 
may expect their adversaries to conduct themselves [lawfully] . . . and to 
respect the civilian population, but they themselves must also cooperate 
by taking all possible precautions for the benefit of their own population 
as is in any case in their own interest.”84  Parties therefore have an 
obligation to protect their own civilians from the consequences of their 
own offensive actions as well as those of the enemy.  Article 58, which 
expands on pre-existing norms, is considered customary international 
law.85 
Although all three obligations in Article 58 play a critical role in 
protecting the civilian population from the dangers of armed hostilities, 
                                                 
81 Isayeva v. Russia, App. No. 57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847, ¶ 200 (2005); see Prosecutor 
v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000); Ethiopia v. Eritrea, 26 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶ 33 (Eth.-Eri. Claims Comm’n 
2005), available at http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVI/1-22.pdf; Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to 
Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, ¶ 88 (2000), 
reprinted in 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/OTP/ 
otp_report_nato_bombing_en.pdf. 
82 Although the obligation to take “constant care” appears in Article 57, which addresses 
the attacking party, the Commentary suggests that both parties have such an obligation:  
“The term ‘military operations’ should be understood to mean any movements, 
manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to 
combat.”  SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 680. 
83 AP I, supra note 1, art. 58. 
84 SANDOZ, supra note 21, at 692. 
85 See, e.g., Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 524. 
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the obligation to refrain from locating military objectives in densely 
populated areas is particularly relevant in today’s conflicts.  A Human 
Rights Watch report on Schools and Armed Conflict highlights these 
dangers.  Although many of the incidents detailed therein involve the 
occupation of schools for headquarters or barracks for soldiers or 
militants, in addition to the positioning of military objectives in schools, 
the dangers for the civilian population are the same.  As one mother in 
Thailand explained after removing her children from a school occupied 
by paramilitary forces for two years:  “[W]hen they moved into the 
school, I feared there would be an attack on the school, so that is the 
reason I withdrew my children[;] . . . if there was an attack on the 
grounds, the children would be hit as well.”86  In the same vein, the 
United States listed several examples in denouncing Iraqi mingling of 
military and civilian objects during the first Gulf War: 
(a) The Iraqi Government moved significant amounts of 
military weapons and equipment into civilian areas with 
the deliberate purpose of using innocent civilians and 
their homes as shields against attacks on legitimate 
military targets; 
(b) Iraqi fighter and bomber aircraft were dispersed into 
villages near military airfields where they were parked 
between civilian houses and even placed immediately 
adjacent to important archaeological sites and historic 
treasures; 
(c) Coalition aircraft were fired upon by anti-aircraft 
weapons in residential neighbourhoods in various cities.  
In Baghdad, anti-aircraft sites were located on hotel 
roofs; 
(d) In one case, military engineering equipment used to 
traverse rivers, including mobile bridge sections, was 
located in several villages near an important crossing 
point.  The Iraqis parked each vehicle adjacent to a 
civilian house.87 
Locating military objectives—and weapons, equipment, and 
headquarters for military personnel certainly qualify as military 
                                                 
86 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/crd0711webwcover.pdf. 
87 Letter from Perm. Rep. of the U.S., to the President of the U.N. Security Council, 2–3, 
U.N. Doc. S/22341 (Mar. 8, 1991). 
Blank: Taking Distinction to the Next Level:  Accountability for Fighter
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
794 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46 
objectives—within civilian buildings or densely populated civilian areas 
violates Article 58(b) and undermines efforts to protect civilians. 
Not only are wars being fought within and among the civilian 
population—whether in southern Lebanon, Sri Lanka, northwest 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Gaza Strip, or other conflicts—but the 
defending party in the overwhelming majority of these situations is 
deliberately taking advantage of the civilian population, strategically 
and tactically, to gain an advantage over a more powerful military.  
Thus, in both 1991 and in 2003, the Iraqi regime purposely parked fighter 
jets in between residential buildings in Baghdad and other cities.88  The 
Iraqi military stored ammunition in school classrooms, “including 
rocket-propelled grenades, 82mm and 100mm mortar shells, and 12.7mm 
machine gun bullets [and] . . . dug fighting positions with anti-aircraft 
guns in . . . schoolyard[s].”89  Hezbollah fighters place rocket launchers 
on the roofs of civilian buildings and fire rockets in close proximity to 
protected locales, and Hamas militants position mobile rocket launchers 
in schoolyards, mosques, next to residential buildings, and in other 
civilian locales.90  The tactical purpose is to protect the fighter jets, rocket 
launchers, or other military objectives by deterring attacks.  The strategic 
purpose, which is significantly more insidious, is to use resulting civilian 
deaths as a broader strategic tool to accuse the attacking party of war 
crimes, diminish support for the war effort in that country, or otherwise 
change the course of the conflict.91  Thus, in pursuing their goal of 
“gain[ing] political leverage by portraying U.S. forces as insensitive to 
LOAC and human rights[,] . . . opponents unconstrained by 
humanitarian ethics now take the strategy to the next level, that of 
                                                 
88 Id.; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, OFF TARGET:  THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR AND CIVILIAN 
CASUALTIES IN IRAQ 74 (2003), available at www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa1203. 
89 SCHOOLS AND ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 86, at 61, n.131. 
90 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MILITARY OPERATIONS BY LEBANESE GUERRILLA FORCES 
(1997), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/isrleb/Isrleb-02.htm (“Because they 
positioned and launched rockets and mortar shells from sites close to the Qana base on 
April 18, Lebanese guerrilla forces also bear responsibility for the civilian casualties caused 
by the massive Israeli retaliatory fire. . . . [T]he guerrillas exhibited a willful disregard for 
the safety of the civilian population.”); see also ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE “GAZA 
WAR”:  A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS 43–47, 49, 51–52, 54–55 (2009), available at 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090202_gaza_war.pdf (describing how Hamas 
fired mortars from the Jabaliya school and uses mosques, houses, and cemeteries for 
military operations and to store weapons); Lebanese Website Blames Hizbullah for Qana 
Deaths, YNET NEWS (Aug. 1, 2006), http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3284514,00.html. 
91 See Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story:  Lawfare and the Mixing of 
Proportionalities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 707 (2011). 
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orchestrating situations that deliberately endanger noncombatants.”92  
Civilians thus become a pawn at the strategic level as well, because they 
are used not only for tactical advantage (e.g., shelter) in specific 
situations, but also for broader strategic and political advantage as well.  
Both the tactical and strategic goals are only realized at the direct 
expense of the civilian population; both goals therefore run directly afoul 
of the “intransgressible principle[]”93 of distinction. 
At the same time, it is important to emphasize that a defending 
party’s violation of these obligations under Article 58 and customary 
international law in no way absolves the attacking party of its duty to 
take precautions and abide by the principles of distinction and 
proportionality.94  In highlighting the lack of enforcement for violations 
of defending party’s precautions, therefore, this Article does not seek to 
shift responsibility from one party to the other.  Rather, the goal is to 
achieve more complete and comprehensive implementation and 
enforcement of the principle of distinction and the obligations both 
parties have to protect civilians accordingly. 
Although extraordinarily common during conflict, few violations of 
Article 58(b) draw attention or condemnation.  Unlike human shielding, 
addressed below, violations of Article 58 are not war crimes.  To that 
end, international tribunals, focused on the more heinous crimes of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, have simply made 
mere mentions of the obligations to avoid locating military objectives in 
heavily populated areas and to take other similar precautions, but have 
never pursued criminal accountability for such actions.95  Nonetheless, 
given both the prevalence of these violations and the consequences for 
both civilians and the overall enforcement of the law, more resounding 
condemnation of these violations could have a significant effect. 
                                                 
92 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Law and Military Interventions:  Preserving Humanitarian Values in 
21st Century Conflicts 12–13 (Carr Ctr. for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy Sch. 
Program on Nat’l Security & Human Rights, Workshop Paper, 2001), available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/Use%20of%20Force/D
unlap2001.pdf. 
93 Nuclear Weapons, supra note 2, ¶ 79. 
94 Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment, ¶ 61 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003) (“As suggested by the Defence, the parties to a conflict are 
under an obligation to remove civilians, to the maximum extent feasible from the vicinity 
of military objectives and to avoid locating military objectives within or near densely 
populated areas.  However, the failure of a party to abide by this obligation does not 
relieve the attacking side of its duty to abide by the principles of distinction and 
proportionality when launching an attack.” (footnote omitted)). 
95 See id.; see also Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-98-29/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 949 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007). 
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International investigations and fact-finding missions have been 
more mixed.  In one notable example, the U.N. Panel of Experts Report 
on Accountability in Sri Lanka specifically refers to the ban on locating 
military objectives in heavily populated areas, noting that “[c]redible 
allegations point to a violation of this provision insofar as they indicate 
patterns of conduct whereby . . . the LTTE deliberately located or used 
mortar pieces, other light artillery, military vehicles, mortar pits, 
bunkers, and trenches in proximity to civilian areas.”96  The report 
explains further, in a clear statement of the grave dangers of using 
military equipment in the midst of civilian areas: 
The LTTE fired artillery from the [No Fire Zones], in 
proximity to [internally displaced person] populations, 
and fired from or stored military equipment near 
[internally displaced persons] or civilian installations 
such as hospitals.  They did this even though they knew 
that it would provoke a response from the [Sri Lanka 
Artillery] and that any retaliating artillery would cause 
harm to civilians.  Sometimes they fired from among 
civilians before quickly moving away, leaving the 
civilians on the receiving end of the return fire.97 
This description fits equally well with the conduct of Hamas and 
other Palestinian armed groups during the conflict in Gaza.  However, 
the Goldstone Report fails to mention Article 58 at all, even though the 
ban on locating military objectives in densely populated Gaza was 
highly relevant.  The Goldstone Report concludes “that there are 
indications that Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from urban 
areas.”98  It neglects to recognize, however, that in this particular conflict, 
the rocket launchers themselves were military objectives for Israel—one 
of the main goals of Operation Cast Lead was to eliminate the ability of 
Palestinian armed groups to fire rockets at civilian areas in southern 
Israel.  Therefore, when Palestinian armed groups launched rockets from 
civilian areas in Gaza, they were locating military objectives in densely 
populated areas, in direct violation of Article 58(b) of Additional 
Protocol I.99  The failure to condemn this violation—indeed to even 
                                                 
96 SRI LANKA REPORT, supra note 67, ¶ 239. 
97 Id. ¶ 177(c). 
98 Goldstone Report, supra note 72, ¶ 450. 
99 In addition, the “LOAC requires that the defence should be conducted from the 
position which would cause the least danger to civilians and civilian objects.”  AUSTRALIA, 
DEFENCE FORCE MANUAL § 553, cited in CIHL, supra note 11, at 430.  One could also argue 
that such attacks violated Article 57(2)(a)(ii) as well, which obligates parties to “take all 
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mention it in many situations, whether Gaza or elsewhere—amounts to a 
failure to fully recognize the obligations of the defending party, 
especially in the complicated scenarios of contemporary conflicts.  Just as 
the densely populated nature of Gaza does not relieve Israel of its 
obligations to distinguish between civilian and military objectives and to 
take precautions, it correspondingly does not relieve Palestinian armed 
groups of their obligations under Article 58. 
The absence of—or at best minimal—condemnation of the practice of 
placing military equipment and objectives in civilian areas thus 
encourages those who wish to take advantage of the civilian 
population’s presence.  Without robust enforcement of this key 
obligation for the protection of civilians, parties will continue to locate 
rocket launchers, military equipment, and other military objectives in 
civilian areas with impunity.  The effect, unfortunately, is to endanger 
civilians rather than protect them.  For civilians caught in the zone of 
combat, and for military planners and commanders making targeting 
determinations, the continued force of this obligation is critical.  
Unfortunately, the absence of any mention of this obligation simply 
gives parties free rein to exploit the civilian population and to 
undermine, at the most fundamental level, one of the central principles 
of LOAC. 
3. Human Shields 
Human shielding refers to the practice of civilians protecting 
military objectives from attack by gathering at the site of the objective 
and using their civilian immunity to deter attacks.  In effect, human 
shielding directly undermines LOAC’s delicate balance between military 
necessity and humanity by using the protections of the latter principle 
for military purposes.  Multiple provisions of the Geneva Conventions 
and Additional Protocol I prohibit the use of the civilian population as a 
shield, with the primary prohibition appearing in Article 51(7) of 
Additional Protocol I: 
The presence or movements of the civilian population or 
individual civilians shall not be used to render certain 
points or areas immune from military operations, in 
particular in attempts to shield military objectives from 
attacks or to shield, favour or impede military 
                                                                                                             
feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, 
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and 
damage to civilian objects.”  AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(2)(a)(ii). 
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operations.  The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the 
movement of the civilian population or individual 
civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives 
from attacks or to shield military operations.100 
The prohibition on human shielding is part of customary 
international law and is included in numerous military manuals of 
countries around the world.  In addition, it is a war crime under the 
Rome Statute of the International Court.101  The use of human shields 
flies directly in the face of a party’s basic obligations under the principle 
of distinction by deliberately mingling civilians with military objects.  As 
a U.N. report investigating an attack on U.N. forces in Somalia in 1993 
stated: 
No principle is more central to the humanitarian law of 
war than the obligation to respect the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants. That principle 
is violated and criminal responsibility thereby incurred 
when organizations deliberately target civilians or when 
they use civilians as shields or otherwise demonstrate a 
wanton indifference to the protection of non-
combatants.102 
Unfortunately, human shielding is all too common in a wide variety 
of armed conflicts around the world and has a long history.  British 
troops placed Boer civilians on trains to prevent Boer commandos from 
attacking them during the Boer War, and General Sherman marched 
Confederate prisoners at the head of his forces on his march through 
Georgia during the U.S. Civil War.103  More recently, during the 1991 
                                                 
100 AP I, supra note 1, art. 57(1); see GC III, supra note 1, art. 23 (“No prisoner of war may 
at any time be sent to, or detained in areas where he may be exposed to the fire of the 
combat zone, nor may his presence be used to render certain points or areas immune from 
military operations.”); GC IV, supra note 1, art. 28 (“The presence of a protected person may 
not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations.”); AP I, 
supra note 1, art. 12(4) (“Under no circumstances shall medical units be used in an attempt 
to shield military objectives from attack.  Whenever possible, the Parties to the conflict shall 
ensure that medical units are so sited that attacks against military objectives do not imperil 
their safety.”). 
101 Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 8(b)(xxiii) (“Utilizing the presence of a civilian or 
other protected person to render certain points, areas or military forces immune from 
military operations.”). 
102 Report PURSUANT to PARAGRAPH 5 of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the 
Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in Somalia Conducted on behalf 
of the Secretary-General, Annex. § 9, U.N. Doc. S/26351 (Aug. 24, 1993). 
103 Robert E. Rodes, Jr., On Clandestine Warfare, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 333, 341 (1982). 
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Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein seized foreign citizens and used 
them to shield designated military targets, calling them “‘special 
guests.’”104  Bosnian Serbs used civilian detainees as human shields to 
protect the army’s advance during the war in Bosnia, and there were 
widespread reports of human shields on bridges and around military 
targets during the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999.105  
In Liberia, rebel “fighters forced civilians out of the government hospital, 
where they had taken refuge, and used them as human shields for their 
positions” during fighting in Tubmanburg.106  The Security Council has 
condemned “use by the Taliban and other extremist groups of civilians 
as human shields” in Afghanistan.107  In one of the more horrifying and 
vivid examples of wholesale human shielding, LTTE fighters forcibly 
prevented civilians from leaving LTTE-controlled areas in the designated 
No Fire Zones, “ensuring their continued presence as a human buffer.”108  
As the U.N. Report on Sri Lanka concludes, the use of civilians “as a 
strategic human buffer” and “as dispensable ‘cannon fodder’ . . . added 
significantly to the total death toll in the conflict.”109  Additional 
examples abound in conflicts from Chechnya to Lebanon and beyond.110 
A few national and international courts have prosecuted and 
convicted soldiers, militia, and other fighters for the use of human 
                                                 
104 See Michael N. Schmitt, Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law, 47 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 292, 295 (2009) (noting that the U.N. Security Council condemned this 
conduct in Resolution 664). 
105 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, Fifth Periodic Report, §§ 36, 37, 39, 84, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1994/47 (Nov. 17, 1993); NATO Says Human Shields Account for Bombing Deaths, 
CNN.COM (May 17, 1999), http://articles.cnn.com/1999-05-17/world/9905_17_kosovo.03_ 
1_nato-spokesman-jamie-shea-human-shields-bombing-pentagon?_s=PM:WORLD. 
106 U.N. Secretary General, Fifteenth Progress Report on UNOMIL, § 24, U.N. Doc. 
S/1996/47 (Jan. 23, 1996). 
107 S.C. Res. 1776, ¶ 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 2007). 
108 SRI LANKA REPORT, supra note 67, ¶ 98. 
109 Id. ¶ 177(a). 
110 See, e.g., U.N. Secretary General, Report Prepared Pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution ES-JO/JO, U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/186 (July 30, 2002); REUVEN ERLICH, HEZBOLLAH’S 
USE OF LEBANESE CIVILIANS AS HUMAN SHIELDS (2006); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY 
DIED:  CIVILIAN CASUALTIES IN LEBANON DURING THE 2006 WAR 52–60 (2007); Stéphanie 
Bouchié de Belle, Chained to Cannons or Wearing Targets on their T-Shirts:  Human Shields in 
International Humanitarian Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 883, 884 (2008) (referencing human 
shielding in Chechnya and Afghanistan); Ron Synovitz, U.S. Says Al-Qaeda Used Afghan 
Children as Human Shields, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2007), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077179.html; see also Schmitt, supra note 104, at 315 
(“[I]n November 2006 Hamas radio issued an appeal for women to converge on a mosque 
in Beit Hanoun where Israeli security forces had trapped militants.  The Palestinian women 
entered the mosque, clothed some of the militants in female attire, and acted as shields for 
them as they escaped.”) (citing Gaza Women Killed in Mosque Siege, BBC NEWS (Nov. 3, 
2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/6112386.stm). 
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shields in some cases, although the number of prosecutions is quite small 
relative to the number of violations.  In two separate cases, the ICTY 
convicted both Serbs and Croats for using civilian detainees to shield 
military objectives or military operations.111  In the ongoing prosecution 
of Radovan Karadzic, the ICTY has also already condemned the use of 
U.N. peacekeepers as human shields, finding that the accused 
“physically secured or otherwise held the U.N. peacekeepers against 
their will at potential NATO air targets, including ammunition bunkers, 
[a] radar site and a nearby communications centre in order to render 
these locations immune from further NATO air strikes.”112  However, in 
all of these cases, the tribunal treated the human shielding as a 
component of other war crimes, such as inhumane treatment, rather than 
convicting the accused directly for the crime of using human shields.113  
Israeli courts have condemned the practice as well, outlawing the use of 
civilians as human shields and as part of an early warning system.114 
Given the widespread use of human shields, significantly greater 
efforts are needed to prosecute perpetrators of this serious war crime.  
Like the other LOAC violations addressed in this Article, human 
shielding poses a direct and severe challenge to the principle of 
distinction and to the protection of civilians during armed conflict.  
Indeed, those who use human shields exploit the obligation of 
distinction and upend LOAC’s balance between military necessity and 
humanity by deliberately mingling civilians and military objects and, 
still worse, using civilians directly to protect military targets.  These 
                                                 
111 See Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 652–654 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, 
Case No. IT-98-34-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 765, 769 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Mar. 31, 2003).  Two early prosecutions for human shielding occurred after World War II.  
British Military Court, Luneberg, Student Case (Case No. 24) (May 6–10, 1946), reprinted in 
4 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS:  SELECTED AND PREPARED BY THE UNITED 
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION 118 (1947) [hereinafter LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS] (convicting General Karl Student for mistreating prisoners of war, including 
using them as a screen to protect advancing German troops); U.S. Military Tribunal, 
Nuremberg, Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb and Thirteen Others (Case No. 72, High Command 
Trial) (Dec. 30, 1947–Oct. 28, 1948), reprinted in 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR 
CRIMINALS, supra (declaring that using prisoners of war as a shield is contrary to 
international law). 
112 Karadzic & Mladic Indictment, supra note 70, Counts 15–16. 
113 Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 716; see Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, 
Case No. IT-95-14/I-T, Judgment, ¶ 229 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
June 25, 1999) (characterizing human shielding as “an outrage upon personal dignity”). 
114 See Adalah—The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v. The Minister of 
Defense, HCJ 3799/02, June 23, 2005 (outlawing the use of civilians to give warnings before 
military operations); see also Ethan Bronner, Israeli Soldiers Convicted of Using Boy as Shield, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2010, at A7 (reporting that two Israeli soldiers were convicted for using a 
Palestinian boy to check bags for explosives during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza). 
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perpetrators thus take the already highly problematic practice of fighting 
from within a civilian population to the next level—from exposing 
civilians to the consequences of military operations to using them as a 
shield, and thus potentially guaranteeing their death or injury.  Until 
such crimes are prosecuted extensively—and as the specific crime of 
human shielding rather than as a component of another crime—the 
practice will not stop, and civilians will continue to be used as pawns by 
parties seeking any advantage, even at the cost of causing the death of 
their own civilians in many cases. 
IV.  TAKING DISTINCTION TO THE NEXT LEVEL:  LOOKING FORWARD 
In the years since World War II, we have seen an extensive and 
comprehensive development of the law pertaining to the protection of 
civilians in armed conflict, ranging from the Fourth Geneva 
Convention—the first law of war treaty specifically devoted to the 
protection of civilians—to numerous international, hybrid, and national 
judicial mechanisms for the prosecution of the most heinous crimes 
committed against innocent civilians.  Many militaries engage in 
extensive training and implement highly tailored ROE during military 
operations to provide soldiers with a range of tools for differentiating 
hostile persons from innocent civilians to fulfill the obligation to take 
constant care to protect civilians.  All of these developments implement 
and enforce the principle of distinction, one of the central foundations of 
LOAC.  Without a doubt, preventing and criminalizing deliberate and 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians is essential to protecting civilians 
during armed conflict. But maximizing the role of distinction in times of 
war demands more.  It demands that the obligation to distinguish 
civilians from fighters and civilian objects from military objects occur not 
only at the level of targeting but at the level of conduct as well. 
At present, innocent civilians face grave danger because of the 
conduct of the forces fighting ostensibly on their behalf, because both 
government forces and militants use the cover of the civilian population 
to gain advantage during combat operations, regardless of the risk to 
those innocent civilians.  Such forces not only have a political or moral 
obligation to protect their own civilians; LOAC places a legal obligation 
on them to do so as well.  In the absence of robust efforts to enforce those 
obligations, however, LOAC’s mandates will not be fulfilled. 
To that end, militaries need to prosecute their own soldiers who 
violate distinction’s central tenets, whether by fighting as civilians, using 
human shields, or locating military equipment and objectives in civilian 
buildings.  International and regional tribunals must give these 
violations greater attention and condemnation, even when tasked with 
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prosecuting only the most serious and widespread crimes.  In some 
situations, such as the crime of utilizing human shields, for example, 
tribunals cannot simply subsume it within other violations, but should 
convict for the war crime of using human shields to make a greater 
impact and highlight the specific dangers of such practices.  The impact 
of such tribunals goes beyond each individual prosecution and 
conviction they render and contributes to an overarching framework of 
international criminal justice and accountability.  Leaving these 
violations aside means that the framework is incomplete. 
Finally, international investigations and fact-finding missions have a 
critically important role to play in this area, especially given the rapidly 
growing use of such investigations and reports in the aftermath of 
conflicts and significant military operations.  Such commissions and fact-
finding missions are not judicial mechanisms and do not play the role of 
court or tribunal, pronouncing guilt or innocence.  In many situations, 
however, their reports will serve as the most comprehensive—or 
ostensibly most comprehensive—outside analysis of the events and 
conduct during the incident in question, giving the reports a more 
substantial story-telling role than that of a criminal case.  Here is where 
the absence of condemnation or even attention to the violations of 
distinction has the greatest effect.  When a report simply does not 
mention Article 58(b) and its ban on locating military objectives in 
heavily populated civilian areas, notwithstanding extensive evidence of 
precisely that conduct, the effect is to ratify and even encourage such 
behavior.  When perfidious tactics garner no condemnation or even 
recognition, armed forces—whether insurgents or government forces—
will continue to use such tactics.  The failure to address perfidy creates 
the impression that such tactics are acceptable during conflict, a highly 
dangerous conclusion. 
Complaining about the nature of asymmetric warfare and the tactics 
of the disadvantaged party may identify violations of the principle of 
distinction, but does not involve action to stop or minimize such 
violations.  Perfidy, human shields, and locating military objectives in 
civilian buildings and areas are not simply tactics that militaries find 
inconvenient or do not like on the part of their enemies.  They are 
violations of LOAC and must be condemned and prosecuted as such.  
Failure to do so will leave distinction’s obligations and promises 
unfulfilled and, more importantly, will continue to leave civilians in 
grave danger. 
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